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REMARKS: <i>See DCI's notes advise him.</i>		
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FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55		REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Routing Slip

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIALS
1	DCI		✓	24 MAY 1968	
2	DDCI		✓		
3	DD/RM				
4	DD/NFA		✓		
5	DD/CT				
6	DD/A				
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8	DD/S&T				
9	GC				
10	LC				
11	IG				
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17	C/IPS				
18	DCI/SS				
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22	ES		✓		

SUSPENSE DATE:

Remarks:

SEE DCI'S NOTE

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Date

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
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 22, 1978

SECRET - GDS



MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Energy
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy

SUBJECT: ~~Presidential Directive/NSC-38~~

Attached is a copy of PD/NSC-38, Comprehensive Test Ban.


This PD is to be held ~~closely and distributed only to those officers~~
~~in your department or agency with a strict need to know.~~

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Christine Dodson".

Christine Dodson
Staff Secretary

SECRET - GDS

3006XX

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONSECRET/GDS

May 20, 1978

Presidential Directive/NSC-38

TO: The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

ALSO: The Secretary of Energy
The Director, Arms Control & Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
~~The Director of Central Intelligence~~
The Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy

SUBJECT: ~~Comprehensive Test Ban~~ (C)

The President has reviewed the recent deliberations of the SCC on the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) issues, and has reached the following conclusions.

a. In view of the importance of maintaining confidence in safety and reliability of our stockpiled nuclear weapons, the US should propose in the CTB negotiations that the treaty have a fixed, five year duration. The treaty would automatically terminate at the end of five years. During the fifth year there would be a review conference to determine whether to negotiate a replacement treaty.

b. In forwarding the treaty to the Senate for ratification the President has decided to state his intention to resume testing at the end of the five years limited only to weapons safety and reliability purposes unless a vigorous safeguards program and studies in the interim indicate that this is not necessary. He has also decided that any further agreement on testing limitations after the five year treaty would be presented to the Senate for ratification.


c. The President has decided that nuclear weapons experiments at minimal yield levels (a few pounds or somewhat higher) should be permitted under the CTB in addition to experiments in laser fusion and other related areas for civil energy purposes. He has also directed that the precise nature and yields of such experiments be detailed in a CTB Safeguards Plan by the SCC and forwarded for his review by June 30, 1978.

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In connection with these decisions, the President has asked that the Soviets be informed of his desire to expedite the CTB negotiations. In this regard, the US delegation should state that the fixed duration treaty proposal, coupled with our earlier historic shift on on-site inspection, represents major movement on the part of the US on issues of Soviet concern and that in return we expect Soviet movement in the direction of our positions on the remaining CTB verification issues.



Zbigniew Brzezinski

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